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What is a mass disaster and how do we distinguish it from a more
conventional event? The difference cannot be one of size alone. The few
thousand deaths resulting from the Chernobyl catastrophe comprise a
mass disaster.1 The 46,000 deaths annually occurring on U.S. highways
do not.' Tort scholars have realized that size alone is inadequate, and
have employed other criteria for identifying mass disasters, including the
economic analysis of tort law,- the distinction between collective and indi-
vidual action,4 and the peculiarities of multiple5 and probabilistice causa-
tion present in many mass disasters.
There is no general analytic framework for characterizing mass disas-
ters.7 This Note suggests that traditional modes of analysis, even taken
collectively, are insufficient to describe many mass disasters. In order to
construct a more complete taxonomy of mass disaster, this Note introduces
the concept of "transformative torts," disasters of such magnitude that
they strain the limits of adjudication.8 To the extent that a disaster falls
1. This figure is nothing but an intelligent guess. Compare Wilson, Chernobyl: Assessing the
Accident, 3 ISSUES Scr. & TECH. 21 (1986) (estimating as few as 200 extra cancer deaths) with
Woodwell, Chernobyl: A Technology that Failed, 3 ISSUES Sci. & TECH., Fall 1986, at 30 (offering
more pessimistic estimate).
2. The highway death figure comes from U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL AB-
STItACTS OF THE UNITED STATES 600 (1986) (1984 figure).
3. See, e.g., W. LANDES & R. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAw (1987);
infra note 33.
4. See, e.g., Abraham, Individual Action and Collective Responsibility: The Dilemma of Mass
Tort Reform, 73 VA. L. REV. 845, 847-49 (1987) (distinguishing between individual and collective
responsibility for causing accidents); Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk
Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 277, 279-83 (1985) (distinguishing between publicly
and privately assumed risk); Abel, A Socialist Approach to Risk, 41 MD. L. REv. 695, 702-10 (1982)
(same, with emphasis on personal autonomy in privately assumed risk).
5. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132
(1980).
6. See generally Robinson, Probabilistic Causation and Compensation for Tortious Risk, 14 J.
LEGAL STUD. 779 (1985) (discussion of probabilistic causation in tort); In re "Agent Orange" Prod.
Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 777-94 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (same, in toxic tort context). Mass torts also
tend to present peculiar jurisdictional problems. See, e.g., Weinstein, Preliminary Reflections on the
Law's Reaction to Disasters, 11 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1986).
7. See Abraham, supra note 4, at 846 (" '[Mlass tort' is not a single, unitary phenomenon, but a
name given to a series of very different kinds of accidents posing a cluster of different legal
problems.")
8. Few large-scale disasters are actually litigated. See infra notes 77-80 and accompanying text. A
more precise name for "transformative torts" might thus be "transformative disasters." The use of
"transformative torts" suggests that these events require some form of adjudication or other social
resolution.
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into this category, it will be refractory to conventional legal or economic
analysis, and thus difficult to resolve through the tort system.
Although transformative tort analysis can explain otherwise incompre-
hensible reactions to mass disasters, it is not a universal theory. Since both
conventional and transformative torts are ideal types, real events will lie
on a continuum stretching from pure transformative to pure conventional
tort.' Since most events-including many mass torts-are far better de-
scribed at the conventional end of the continuum, transformative tort anal-
ysis is needed only for exceptional cases.
Section I describes two responses to mass disasters. The adjudication of
the Agent Orange case was a bold and imaginative response to an injury
that may never have existed; the Price-Anderson Act contains a legislative
response to an event that, may never happen. Both of these responses are
hard to justify in terms of traditional tort analysis, but can be understood
in terms of the transformative tort analysis presented in Section II. The
concepts developed in Section II are then applied to Agent Orange'0 and
Price-Anderson. Section III further develops the analysis, discussing the
resolution of transformative torts in both legislative and judicial contexts.
I. Two MASS DISASTERS
Neither the Price-Anderson Act nor the Agent Orange litigation reflects
conventional images of tort law. This Section describes these two anoma-
lous responses to mass disaster.
A. Agent Orange
The Agent Orange litigation was an unusual tort case, handled in an
unusual fashion. This class action suit was brought by Vietnam War vet-
erans and their families against eight chemical companies that manufac-
tured the herbicide "Agent Orange," used extensively to defoliate jungle
land in Vietnam. The class consisted of all the veterans who allegedly
were exposed to the herbicide, and their families. The veterans claimed a
variety of harms to themselves and their children and alleged that these
were caused by a dioxin"' impurity in the herbicide. The suit against the
9. This conventional-transformative continuum is not the only dimension along which tort law
can be projected. Economics has analytic power, as do approaches such as causation or the public-
private distinction. See supra notes 3-6. The complete typology of tort is not only continuous, but
multidimensional. This Note examines only one of these dimensions.
10. Agent Orange, 597 F. Supp. at 740. This litigation has recently concluded at the appellate
level. In nine separate decisions, the Second Circuit generally upheld Judge Weinstein's rulings. In re
"Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987),followed by 821 F.2d 139 (2d Cir.
1987), cert. denied sub nom. Dow Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 108 S. Ct. 344 (1987).
11. The full chemical name for this substance is 2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzo-para-dioxin. The tox-
icology and epidemiology of dioxin are briefly discussed, with special attention to the Vietnam veter-
ans, in Gough, Environmental Epidemiology: Separating Politics and Science, 3 Issues Sct. &
TECH., Summer 1987, at 20, 22-27.
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manufacturers was based on a failure-to-warn theory; the government was
involved as a third-party defendant.
The sheer size of the plaintiff class was enough to make the case un-
usual, but more extraordinary were its political implications. To a large
extent, this case involved the reception of America's returning Vietnam
veterans, who according to trial Judge Jack Weinstein, "have been ...
treated with less favor and respect than they should have been."1 Not
only did the plaintiffs want compensation in the usual sense; they also
wanted public recognition of their plight."3
Judge Weinstein did not pretend to treat this unusual tort case in a
conventional manner. He introduced uncertainty into the law in order to
encourage settlement.' 4 He avoided articulated decisions whenever possi-
ble.15 Moreover, in both his informal bench comments and his twisting of
precedent,'" he tried to minimize any sense of rule-bound law. In his deci-
sions, his prose style was frequently compassionate and affective, rather
than lawyerly and cognitive. 7 He acted as if he were dealing not with a
case at law, but rather with a political problem that required a political
solution transcending the legal conflict between plaintiffs and defendants.
Judge Weinstein strongly felt that government intervention was required
for a successful conclusion to the case,' 8 and pushed vigorously for a
settlement.
B. The Price-Anderson Act
The Price-Anderson Act' 9 is the federal tort law for nuclear plant acci-
dents, and preempts state tort laws. ° The Act is structured in three tiers.
At the lowest tier, relatively minor nuclear accidents are handled by the
12. Agent Orange, 597 F. Supp. at 749.
13. "[To] justify the veterans' sufferings by allowing them to tell their story, find an authoritative
explanation for their conditions, and assign moral and legal responsibility. . . . [Tihe prospect of
monetary compensation [was]. . .subsidiary." P. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL 171 (1986).
14. At one point in the litigation, Weinstein pointed out that the legal "uncertainty enhance[d] the
desirability of the settlement." Agent Orange, 597 F. Supp. at 754. This uncertainty was largely
created by Weinstein himself. See P. SCHUCK, supra note 13, at 131-38; cf. Agent Orange, 597 F.
Supp. at 816 (concerning uncertainty of relevant statute of limitations); id. at 842-43 (concerning
uncertainty caused by indefinite plaintiff and defendant problems).
15. "Whenever possible, [Weinstein] avoided formal opinions and gave many informal signals
from the bench; these revealed his 'preliminary' thinking to the lawyers without really committing
him to a position . . . ." P. SCHUCK, supra note 13, at 124-25.
16. One Weinstein invention was his bold invocation of "national consensus law" to settle the
thorny choice-of-laws problem posed by class certification in the suit. P. SCHUCK, supra note 13, at
128-31. Schuck characterizes this particular legal move as "combining prestidigitation and rank in-
subordination [in the face of a Second Circuit ruling]." Id. at 130.
17. See infra note 58.
18. P. SCHUCK, supra note 13, at 132.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1982).
20. See, e.g., NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, THE PRICE-ANDERSON ACT-THE THIRD
DECADE (NUREG-0957) (1983) [hereinafter NUREG]. The Price-Anderson preemption of the tort
system survived takings and due process challenges in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envt'l Study
Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
1988]
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 97: 645
tort system, buttressed by a compulsory liability insurance scheme.21 Once
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the administrative agency respon-
sible for civilian nuclear power) declares an "Extraordinary Nuclear Oc-
currence" (ENO), the second tier of the Act is invoked.22 After an ENO is
declared, all cases are removed from the tort system and consolidated
under one federal judge in proceedings that are essentially administrative.
When the $650 million liability limit28 of Price-Anderson is reached, the
utility is exempt from further liability.
Up to this point, conventional tort economics suffices to explain the
Price-Anderson Act. Small-scale accidents are adequately treated by tradi-
tional tort adjudication. Larger accidents are handled by an administrative
scheme which should be easier and cheaper to administer than individual-
ized adjudication, but that still is consistent with the norms of deterrence
and compensation that are the economic foundation of traditional tort
law.24 But the liability cap cannot be explained within this paradigm. The
cap limits the deterrent effect of damages, and thus provides an inef-
ficiently low level of safety.2"
Above the $650 million liability limit, the Act directs Congress to
"thoroughly review the particular incident and . . . take whatever action
is deemed necessary and appropriate to protect the public from the conse-
quences of a disaster of such magnitude ... ."" Mass tort commentators
generally have ignored this congressional tier of Price-Anderson, viewing
the Price-Anderson structure as a two-tier compensation scheme with a
21. This liability insurance pool itself is composed of two tiers. See NUREG, supra note 20. The
first $160 million of insurance is provided by two consortia of private insurers. Most of the coverage
comes from a secondary "retrospective" policy, which requires all nuclear plant operators to pay up to
5 million dollars per plant per year after an accident has occurred. See 42 U.S.C. § 2210(b)(3) (1982);
see also L. ROCKErr, FINANCIAL PROTECTION AGAINST NUCLEAR HAZARDS: THIRTY YEARS' Ex-
PERIENCE UNDER THE PRICE-ANDERSON Acr 18-19 (1984) (since amount of secondary insurance
depends on number of nuclear plants in operation, total size of liability insurance pool now approxi-
mately $650 million). Nuclear liability insurance is not to be confused with nuclear property (first
party) insurance, which is not covered by Price-Anderson. See NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION,
NUCLEAR PROPERTY INSURANCE: STATUS AND OUTLOOK (NUREG-0891) (1982).
22. An ENO is declared when a large-scale radiation release will probably result in substantial
damage. Upon declaration of an ENO, utilities and their indemnitors must waive all defenses, except
causality. See 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n) (1982).
23. See supra note 21.
24. See infra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
25. Under some circumstances, liability caps in tort may be economically justifiable. For example,
an argument may be made against pain and suffering damages in the products liability context. See,
e.g., Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353
(1988). These caps may also be seen as a sophisticated response to transaction cost problems induced
by bankruptcy and limited insurability. See Weinstein, supra note 6, at 18-21. But in general, caps
on damages cannot be economically justified. See W. LANDES & R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 15.
Landes and Posner therefore view the Price-Anderson cap as simple redistribution to a well-organized
interest group. See also Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Foreword: The Court and
the Economic System, 98 HARv. L. Rav. 4, 42-45 (1984) (discussion of Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee,
464 U.S. 238 (1984) as judicial recognition of Price-Anderson as interest-group bargain).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e)(2) (1982). This language, inserted into the 1975 amendments to the
Price-Anderson Act, was designed to make "explicit the intention contained in the legislative history
of the original Act." L. ROCKETT, supra note 21, at 20.
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liability cap.27 Ex post congressional reaction to a large nuclear disaster is
generally not considered an integral part of Price-Anderson.
The carefully articulated procedures and guaranteed insurance below
the liability limit discourage congressional intervention and permit con-
ventional judicial or administrative processes to work. However, Price-
Anderson encourages intervention when total claims exceed the limit. The
political firestorm engendered by the liability cap, in conjunction with the
congressional promise embedded in 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e)(2), will force
Congress to act. Section 2210(e)(2) can therefore be viewed as a predeter-
mined threshold for the transition from conventional accident law to a
new, political regime.
The Agent Orange adjudication seems to be questionable law; the lia-
bility cap of Price-Anderson seems to be suspect economics. 8 The trans-
formative tort framework developed in Section II shows that both Agent
Orange and Price-Anderson are sensible responses to difficult problems.
II. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Transformative torts are best seen in terms of community standards
that, in turn, are conveniently placed in the context of tort economics.
Therefore, this Note develops the notion of transformative torts in a se-
quence starting with familiar concepts of tort economics, progressing to a
discussion of community standards as a hidden requirement of tort eco-
nomics, and concluding with an analysis of transformative torts as a
breakdown of limited notions of community standards.
A. Tort Economics and Community Standards
In the last twenty years, the economic analysis of tort and other acci-
dent law has been widely accepted in the legal academy for its broad ana-
lytic power.2 ' Economic analysis explains the characteristics of the tort
system in terms of its ability to ensure an efficient allocation of social
goods and the injuries those goods produce." Its single-minded emphasis
on economic efficiency makes it a powerful intellectual tool, capable of
27. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
28. The converse is just as true. Awarding $180 million for a nonexistent injury seems economi-
cally unsound; ex post congressional largesse hardly seems to be part of the rule of law.
29. See, e.g., G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970); W. LANDES & R. POSNEt,
supra note 3; S. SHAVELL, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF TORT LAW (1987). Accident law need not
be limited to tort or tort-like systems such as workers' compensation. Many of the economic goals of
accident law can be performed, in principle, by regulation. See Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus
Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 357 (1984).
30. The efficiency criterion is satisfied when economic activity, "injurer care, and victim care [are]
... carried to the point where the last dollar in care (or foregone [activity]) yields a benefit of a
dollar in reduced accident costs." Landes-& Posner, A Positive Economic Analysis of Products Liabil-
ity, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 535, 539 (1985). "Care" is the cost incurred providing for safety.
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reducing the complex characteristics of accident law to more analytically
tractable questions of economic costs and benefits.31
The same idea of efficiently allocating goods and their associated
hazards pertains to all scales of activity, from driving an automobile to
generating nuclear power. Large-scale torts need not violate the economic
framework of tort, if some modifications are admitted.32 For example,
large-scale torts usually have a different structure of adjudicatory transac-
tion costs, and may therefore benefit from different adjudicatory proce-
dures.3 3 Correlation of risks in imperfect capital markets34 is a more sub-
31. Although the economic analysis of accident law is analytically quite rigorous, its empirical
predicates are open to doubt. For example, there is little evidence that changes in legal standards
display predicted behavioral effects. See Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV.
555 (1983).
Empirical critiques of the law and economics movement are rare. More commonly, the basic as-
sumptions of the law and economics movement are attacked. See, e.g., Leff, Economic Analysis of
Law: Some Realism about Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451 (1974) (law and economics as non-
falsifiable nominalism); Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 563,
574-75 (1983) (law and economics is flawed conjunction of objectivism and formalism); West, Au-
thority, Autonomy and Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral and Political Visions of Franz
Kajka and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 384 (1985) (economists' notion of autonomous deci-
sionmaker psychologically unrealistic). These "basic assumptions" vary according to the attacker (or
defender), but seldom address the law and economics movement on its own terms. But see, e.g., W.
LANDES & R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 9-24 (noting, but minimizing problems of insufficient quan-
titative testing, unrealistic behavioral assumptions, absence of causal mechanism, imperfect congruence
with observations); R. NELSON & S. WIrrER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE
363 (1982) (noting near-tautological nature of economists' principles of clarity, perfection and
costlessness of contract, property and law enforcement); 0. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITU-
TIONS OF CAPITALISM 44 n.3 (1985) ("A more complete and systematic treatment of the ramifications
of dignity for economic organization is sorely needed.").
Although this Note may be viewed as another attack on the ability of economics to explain legal
ordering, nothing in this Note is inconsistent with economic analysis. It is better to view this Note's
approach as an extension of the economic analysis of tort, an extension from static economic analysis
to a dynamic realm. See infra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
32. See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text.
33. Mass torts could be defined as the subset of cases that could be litigated at lower cost if joined
to other, similar cases through joinder or class action techniques. See Trangsrud, Joinder Alternatives
in Mass Tort Litigation, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 779 (1985). Cases like nuclear power plant disasters
can presumably be litigated cheaply in one mass proceeding because of the common fact patterns for
all the injured parties. In contrast, each automobile accident is caused by a separate event, and would
not profit from mass joinder. Transaction cost considerations suggest that non-judicial fora are more
efficient for large torts. The large academic literature on mass torts treats individualized adjudication
unfavorably. See, e.g., Elliott, Goal Analysis Versus Institutional Analysis of Toxic Compensation
Systems, 73 GEO. L.J. 1357 (1985); Huber, supra note 4; Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in
Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 887-924
(1984); Trangsrud, supra.
Transaction cost peculiarities need not be the only economic criterion for mass torts. Landes and
Posner have constructed an economic model of mass tort based on three factors: uninsurability (pre-
sumably due to correlation of risks; see infra note 34), time delay (with accompanying degradation of
evidence) and uncertain causality. W. LANDES & R. POSNER, supra note 3. This model does not
address the concerns brought forth in this Note.
34. "Correlation of risks" is insurance jargon that reflects insurers' unwillingness to take risks.
Insurers avoid risk by pooling their risks among a large group of comparable insured parties whose
risks as a group will mature at a predictable rate. Since both premium and payout streams are pre-
dictable, the insurer bears no risk. However, if the individual risks are correlated (presumably due to
some factor common to many insured parties, such as a hurricane), risks will not mature predictably,
and the insurer has to bear risk itself. If the capital market were perfect, uncorrelated risks could not
exist; the insurer could always spread the risk over enough time to ensure a large number of uncorre-
lated events per accounting period. Only capital market imperfections force insurers to use accounting
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tle addition to the economic framework of tort. But these factors are
additions to, not violations of, the framework. No existing extension of
conventional tort economics can explain the Agent Orange litigation or the
Price-Anderson scheme. To find a justification for these cases, we must
look to the problem of measuring social costs.
Given the economic goals of tort and a legal system that satisfies them,
how do we measure the social costs that we seek to minimize? Conven-
tional economic treatments of tort leave this question unanswered. This
problem of measurement is central to transformative tort analysis.
Economists prefer to measure social costs with reference to perfect mar-
kets. 5 Given such markets, price conveys all possible information about
social cost.a" Such a market may be viewed as an excellent measure of
community standards. But markets are merely the least controversial way
of determining social cost; they are not the only arbiters of community
standards, nor always the most efficient ones.37 Markets are frequently
poor arbiters for tort injuries. Markets for pain do not exist, and contem-
porary tort law seldom chooses to impute a shadow market. Tort adjudi-
cation must therefore frequently determine community standards indepen-
dently of the market."8
The community standards embodied in tort law serve as such a means
of measurement, an alternative to the market. No single set of community
standards is used by the tort system. Some community standards are ex-
pressed in formal rules; others in an inarticulate, "customary" way. The
inarticulate community standards are generally considered to be within
the province of the jury, although judges may also apply their own inar-
ticulate standards upon occasion. Liability and damages are both deter-
mined in accordance with these community standards. Although a stan-
dard prima facie requirement 9 formalizes the liability determination,
inarticulate standards enter through legal devices such as the "reasonable
person" test in negligence analysis.4 Calculations of damages rest even
periods short enough so that correlation is a problem.
35. A perfect market is characterized by large numbers of buyers and sellers, perfect information,
and no transaction costs. See Stigler, Perfect Competition, Historically Contemplated, 65 J. PoL
EcoN. l (1957).
36. Cf. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945) (discussion of
price as social coordinator).
37. See, e.g., 0. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES 42 (1975) (imperfect markets fre-
quently less efficient than other means of social ordering).
38. Even the presence of a well-developed market does not relieve the tort system of the need to
apply non-market standards. Compensation does not consist solely of converting damages to dollars; it
also requires measuring the injury. Consider the economic value of psychological damages. The mar-
ket may determine what an hour of psychotherapy costs, but the market cannot determine how much
psychotherapy is due a frightened victim.
39. To establish a prima fade case of negligence, the defendant must be shown to owe the plain-
tiff a duty of care. This duty must be breached, and the plaintiff must suffer a legally cognizable harm
caused by the breach. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS 164-65 (5th ed. 1984).
40. The "reasonable person" of tort law embodies community, rather than particularized stan-
1988]
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more obviously upon community standards. Market valuation represents
the standards of the entire community;41 non-market valuation reflects the
standards of the judge and jury acting as community representatives.
B. Dynamism: Transformative Torts Defined
Tort law seldom acknowledges that the adjudication of an individual
event can change the community standards by which the event was adjudi-
cated.4 ' The economic analysis of tort generally shares this tacit static as-
sumption. However, the resolution of some cases can significantly change
the community standards used to adjudicate them. Such cases,43 whose
adjudication will force a change in community standards, will be called
"transformative torts." Transformative torts involve dynamism in social
choice."
Although social choices are predicated on the chooser's values, the con-
sequences of social choice change the values of the chooser. Presumably,
any social choice is initially predicated on the values of the chooser at the
time of the choice, before the effects of the choice on the chooser are felt.
Although the chooser gets the outcome desired at the time the choice is
made, this may not be the desired outcome in light of the new value sys-
tem engendered by the choice. 5
This phenomenon is not generally troublesome. Since the consequences
of most choices are relatively small, social choice can proceed by an itera-
tive method. A small choice is made; values change slightly in accordance
with the choice; a corrective choice is made-a process exemplified by the
organic evolution of the common law.4 1 We can safely ignore the slight,
ever-present effect of choice on value. Dynamism begins to bite only when
the choice changes values considerably.
dards. See Vaughan v. Menlove, 3 Bing. (N.C.) 468, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P. 1837) (negligence
dependent on degree of caution exercised by man of ordinary prudence, rather than measured by
standards of defendant).
41. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
42. But see, e.g., The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932) (custom of not equipping vessels
with radio receivers not dispositive in determining negligence in vessel not so equipped; determination
of negligence set new customary standard). Neither is the economic analysis of tort law always static;
the so-called "ex post Learned Hand" criterion for liability proposed by some economic analysts has
an explicitly dynamic rationale of providing incentives to acquire new information. See Calabresi &
Klevorick, Four Tests for Liability in Torts, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 621-25 (1985). This approach,
however, is the exception and not the rule.
43. The emphasis of this Note is on adjudication, not the event being adjudicated. Events them-
selves can change community standards, frequently even more than their subsequent adjudication. The
sociological apparatus required to discuss these events would be outside the scope of this legal Note.
44. See Tribe, Technology Assessment and the Fourth Discontinuity: The Limits of Instrumental
Rationality, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 617, 633-41 (1973); see also Sunstein, Legal Interference with
Private Preferences, 53 U. Cmi. L. REv. 1129, 1158-66 (1986) (discussing related issue of endoge-
nous preferences).
45 This discussion assumes that the chooser, although presumptively omnipotent, is not quite
omniscient. She does not know how her choice will affect her values.
46. This iterative, incremental method is also the common law's favored response to exogenous
changes, such as new technologies. See infra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
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When adjudication does not significantly change the common law,
courts are guided by the community standards embedded in the law. This
is not true when dynamism is significant. In such cases, a curious dialogue
between the courts and the community emerges. The courts look for stan-
dards: "What are the community standards by which we adjudicate?"
The community responds: "We won't know until the court articulates
them."
47
Transformative tort litigation48 must involve some sort of notion of
community-mediated reconciliation between the litigants. In conventional
tort litigation, compensation-which makes the victim whole-is reckoned
by preexisting community standards -and the facts of the case.4" But if
dynamics affects values, the community standards that decide whether lia-
bility exists"0 or what an "injury" is "worth" become uncertain. Compen-
sation, as determined by static community standards, is thus not a coher-
ent goal of transformative tort adjudication.
Reconciliation is a more attainable goal. Reconciliation involves a dia-
logue among the victim, tortfeasor and society in which the parties' expec-
tations and perceptions will undergo mutual modification.51 Victims will
want vindication, " tortfeasors absolution" and society a sense that the
trouble has been healed.
47. The judgment of Solomon is a classic illustration of dynamism. 1 Kings 3:16-29; see Minow,
The Judgment of Solomon and the Experience of Justice, in THE STRUCTURE OF PROCEDURE 447
(1979). Solomon's decision to divide the baby transformed one woman's conception of the issue, caus-
ing her to put the welfare of the baby ahead of the claim of right she had previously asserted. This, in
turn, changed Solomon's decree; he awarded the baby to the true mother. Although exemplary of
dynamism, the judgment of Solomon is not otherwise a good model for transformative torts, which
affect the law as well as the parties. Since the adjudicator is the follower, as well as the shaper of
community standards, legal attitudes must change with social ones. "We have no reason to believe that
Solomon himself was challenged to grow through this experience." Minow, Interpreting Rights: An
Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1860, 1907 n.192 (1987).
48. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
49. Although this Note contends that this is the static economic view of compensation, see supra
notes 29-34 and accompanying text, even the static value of compensation need not be exclusively
monetizable, although damages are denominated in strictly monetary terms:
To be compensated for injury or illness, then, quite aside from supplying a needed source of
material support, legitimizes one's feelings of discomfort and apprehension. One . . . has a
licence not only to withdraw from the source of that pain but to explain to others why one has
done so.
K. ERIKSON, EVERYTHING IN ITS PATH 112-13 (1976).
50. This discussion of transformative torts has been couched in terms of the social evaluation of
accident costs, rather than determination of liability. This evaluation-of-costs approach, while theoret-
ically easier to digest, is unnecessary. Agent Orange, with its forced settlement, was in effect a surpris-
ing imposition of liability. This Note will discuss the category of natural disasters as a limitation of
liability consistent with the transformative tort approach. See infra notes 75-80 and accompanying
text.
51. See infra notes 54-63 and accompanying text (discussing Price-Anderson and Agent Orange
in light of transformative tort theory).
52. Vindication may include-or require--compensation. See supra note 49.
53. Even such popular corporate villains as large chemical companies seem to desire community
approval for their current activities and forgiveness for their past record. This desire strikes me as
sincere, Bhopal notwithstanding. See, e.g., Wishart, Openness, 64 CHEM. & ENG'G NEWS, July 14,
1986, at 3.
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Unlike compensation, reconciliation is extremely procedure-dependent.
Victims are compensated according to external community standards. In
principle, these community standards exist independently of the process
chosen to find them. Reconciliation, on the other hand, does not depend
on fixed community standards, but rather on dialogue among the parties.
The results of this dialogue will depend on the way the dialogue is con-
ducted, on the procedure chosen.
It is important to emphasize that dynamism is seldom in the fore-
ground, and most tortlike events have little transformative character. Indi-
vidual events seldom greatly transform community values, particularly in
the context of a single tort adjudication. But the transformative tort frame-
work can still explain many puzzling aspects of major disasters, such as
the Price-Anderson Act and the Agent Orange litigation.
C. Agent Orange and Price-Anderson
The transformative tort concept can explain many problematic aspects
of mass disasters. Neither Judge Weinstein's treatment of the Agent Or-
ange case nor the legislative prescriptions of the Price-Anderson Act ap-
pear aberrational when viewed in the transformative tort framework. Be-
side explaining individual problematic cases, the transformative tort
framework can also partially explain the distinction between natural di-
sasters and torts.
1. Agent Orange
Agent Orange was more than a mass toxic torts case, it was a response
to the reception Vietnam veterans received after their return from South-
east Asia. Not only were the veterans seeking recognition from the courts
and society at large"-as they would in a conventional lawsuit-they
were seeking recognition from a society that they thought had deliberately
ignored their plight since the end of the war. Recognition would change
society: fostering transformative reconciliation rather than monetary-or
even dignitary-compensation.
Judge Weinstein acted as if he were trying to resolve a transformative
tort in the role of a judge.55 Aware of the dynamic aspects, Weinstein used
the adjudication to garner political support for the plaintiffs' cause. This
led to a perverse use of law: a continuous attempt to inveigle the govern-
54. "The case came to symbolize their most human commitments and passions: their insistence
upon respect and recognition, their hope for redemption and renewal, and their hunger for vindication
and vengeance. For them, it was a searing morality play projected onto a national stage." P. ScHucK,
supra note 13, at 11.
55. Although Weinstein's Agent Orange opinions and actions may be explained under the trans-
formative tort paradigm, his non-judicial writings on mass disasters are those of a judge concerned
primarily with efficient case management. See Weinstein, supra note 6, at 15-50; Weinstein, The
Role of the Court in Toxic Tort Litigation, 73 GEo. L.J. 1389 (1985).
[Vol. 97: 645
Transformative Torts
ment into explicit political involvement, and a nationwide set of fairness
hearings that seemed more political than judicial.5"
His insistence on a large settlement in a case he deemed probably base-
less indicates that he strove for reconciliation, rather than compensation.
Although Weinstein deeply understood the case, he was limited by his
institutional role as judge. He realized the limitations of his judicial role
and tried to transcend them.
Weinstein's partial failure to achieve a meaningful settlement demon-
strates the limits of the present legal system in dealing with transformative
torts. The $180 million settlement did not appease the plaintiffs; a fact
partially explicable because settlements, by definition, are private acts that
exclude society. 57 Although Weinstein tried to get as broad a participation
in the settlement as possible, 8 he could not get "the government to join
with plaintiffs and defendants in ... their noble goal [of reconcilia-
tion]".59 With no government involvement or formal judgment by the
court, the settlement could not achieve the plaintiffs' goal of reconciliation
with society at large.
2. Price-Anderson
A large-scale nuclear plant disaster fits the transformative tort para-
digm. Our collective values regarding such a large and frightening event
56. Judge Weinstein wrote:
Even though the evidence presented to the court to date suggests that the case is without
merit, many of those who testified at the Fairness Hearings indicated that they sought its
prosecution not for money but for public vindication. It may be, to paraphrase Sir James
George Frazer, that the litigation itself has served a useful function; like many trials, the
"main object of the ceremony . . . is simply to effect a total clearance of all the ills that have
been infecting a people."
In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 857 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
57. See Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984). "To be against settlement is only to
suggest that when the parties settle, society gets less than what appears. . . .Parties might settle
while leaving justice undone." Id. at 1085. Settlement deprives inadequately represented parties of a
voice. Id. at 1078-82. If the Agent Orange dispute were truly bipolar, a settlement process would
more probably constitute a reconciliative act. See McThenia & Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94 YALE
L.J. 1660 (1985).
To be sure, the perceived small size of the settlement and the defendants' refusal to admit fault
were doubtless significant, as well.
58. Weinstein's account of the post-settlement Fairness Hearings was highly anecdotal, affective
and compassionate. Agent Orange, 597 F. Supp. at 764-75. This contrasts with the rest of his Settle-
ment Memo, written in the dry and cognitive style typical of legal prose. He seemed as concerned
with the extent of the public debate accompanying the settlement, id. at 763, as with its acceptance
among the plaintiff class. Id. at 775.
59. Id. at 862. "As a result [of governmental nonparticipation] . . . possible trials and appeals
continue to burden the parties and the courts, disturb veterans and their families and roil the con-
science of the nation." Id. at 750.
Although no government action has been taken to date, congressional sympathy for the veterans
definitely exists and might eventually result in some form of legislation, despite the lack of any con-
vincing scientific evidence that Agent Orange has affected the health of Vietnam veterans. Several
compensation bills are pending before Congress. See Hanson, Science Failing to Back Up Veteran
Concerns About Agent Orange, 65 CHEM. & ENG'G NEws, Nov. 9, 1987, at 7, 14. For the role of
congressional action in transformative tort adjudication, see infra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
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cannot develop gradually over the course of many similar, small-scale
events. Rather, they will develop at once, in the aftermath of such a disas-
ter. The way we treat such an event when it occurs will thus affect the
way we value it afterwards.
The societal impact of a nuclear accident may range from small (e.g., a
negligible radiation leak) to transformative-Chernobyl. The three-tier
structure of Price-Anderson is readily explicable as a graduated reaction
to a range of possible nuclear accidents. The two lower tiers can be ex-
plained in static economic terms, while the third, congressional tier is a
separate reaction to transformative torts. The congressional tier will not
resemble adjudication. Congressional action need not be articulated, in the
same sense that a judicial opinion is.80 However, inarticulate congres-
sional action certainly need not be irrational, just as Presidential power to
declare a disaster area need not be irrational in either motivation or exe-
cution.61 The decisionmaker need not be concerned with precedent. "Pro-
tecting the public from the consequences of a [huge nuclear] disaster"
must be viewed as a political, rather than a judicial response.62
As a political process, the congressional tier can be oriented toward re-
conciliation rather than strict compensation, a dynamic recognition of
what the accident means to us all, not just the litigants at bar. The $650
million trigger serves as a border between the world of conventional acci-
dent law-a world of fixed social values associated with ideas of deter-
rence and compensation-and a dynamic world where adjudication of the
event is expected to transform social values and in which "political" rec-
onciliation is central.63
D. A Role for Individuation?
Community standards are neither homogeneous nor consistent. We
view all human lives as equally sacred, but we "would accept railroad
crossing accidents because it costs too much to eliminate grade crossings
and yet spend 'whatever it takes' to save a known individual trapped in a
coal mine."6 The phenomenon of individuation-driven by our personal
60. See infra note 85 and accompanying text.
61. Presidential authority to declare a major disaster, which is predicated upon a gubernatorial
request for aid, is otherwise unlimited. See 42 U.S.C. § 5141(b) (1982).
62. For a discussion of transformative torts' relation to legal and other process, see infra notes
84-97 and accompanying text.
63. If reconciliation is the transformative tort analogue of the conventional concept of compensa-
tion, what is the transformative tort analogue of deterrence, the other (and economically prior) goal of
conventional tort law? There is none. Since dynamism presupposes that ex post values are unpredict-
able ex ante, deterrence is meaningless in the transformative tort framework. This implies that, inso-
far as they are transformative torts, mass torts involve inherently retroactive legal transitions. See
infra note 93. See generally Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HAv. L. Ray.
511 (1986) (legal transitions introduce uncertainty to deterrence calculus).
64. See G. CALABRESI, supra note 29, at 25.
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identification with the victim-is one of the chief sources of inconsistency
in community standards.
Intuitively, individuation would seem muted in the mass disasters asso-
ciated with transformative torts. "A single death is a tragedy, a million
deaths is a statistic." 5 However, the mythic proportions of the wholesale
disaster, filtered through modern telecommunications technology, touch us
all. In contrast, our neighbor's misery affects only a small circle of friends.
In a curious inversion of sentiment, the large-scale accident may become
more individuated than the sum of many individual tragedies."' We all see
ourselves and our loved ones at an airplane crash, and cannot judge the
event dispassionately. Only the survivors individuate the -random roadside
accident,6 7 and the rest of us retain the community standards to judge it.
In this sense, mass individuation of an event is simply one cause of the
dynamism that undergirds transformative tort analysis. It may account for
the disproportionate effect of comparatively small accidents: say, the Chal-
lenger disaster."8
Individuation may also be viewed differently, as a separate analytical
category within transformative torts. Individuation connotes special identi-
fication with another. It cannot be treated rationally without doing vio-
lence to our sense of universal rules.69 This feeling of identification could
conceivably be regarded as just another community standard, with rules of
its own. However, we shrink from enunciating these rules, from stating
sympathy or identification as rules of law. To do this would deny the
65. J. BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 954 (14th ed. 1968) (attributed to Stalin).
66. These excerpts from a newspaper article may illustrate this phenomenon:
Thousands around the world are rooting for little Cecelia Cichan, the miracle sole survivor
of fiery Flight 255.
Gifts and words of hope have poured in for the 4-year-old, who still lay unconscious Tues-
day in Mott Children's Hospital in Ann Arbor, Mich.
One gift: a used teddy bear. "Anybody that thought enough of the little girl to bring her a
teddy bear that probably one of their children played with is just tremendous," said Anthony
Cichan.
Whitmer, Survivor Tugs World's Heartstrings, U.S.A. Today, Aug. 19, 1987, at A3, col. 2.
67. To be sure, the adjudicators also individuate this accident; the act of adjudication may-to
some extent-be transformative to the judge and jury. But the judge and the jury are cabined by
procedural and substantive rules designed to reduce dynamism and individuation to acceptable levels.
The impersonal ritual of the courtroom serves a similar function. See J. NOONAN, The Passengers of
Palsgraf, in PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW 111 (1976).
68. The loss of life in this disaster was relatively small, and the victims certainly assumed the risk.
Yet public interest in the disaster was intense, triggered largely by the individuation of the astronauts,
particularly the schoolteacher Christa McAuliffe. For an account of the impact of the mass individua-
tion of astronauts on the early space program, see T. WOLFE, THE RIGHT STUFF (1979).
69. As Roberto Unger has noted:
It is the ethic of sympathy . . . [that] values the present and immediate person more than the
future or distant one, and it breaks all moral rules in behalf of the loved one. Such an act
always seems irrational, for our very conception of rationality has become identical to the idea
of following [rational] rules. Because all human love is a particular relationship among partic-
ular persons, it must rebel against the universalizing tendencies of consequentialist or rule-
bound ethics.
R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 141-42 (1975).
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universality of law, if not its utility. Since we cannot do so, individua-
tion-although a real force-is outside the law.
E. What a Transformative Tort Is Not
The concept of transformative tort is a limited one. Not all disasters
qualify, not even all large-scale disasters. The transformative tort is an
ideal type, and even events such as nuclear disasters have many conven-
tional characteristics. Indeed, most mass torts are better understood
outside of the transformative tort framework. Of those that could fit the
transformative tort framework, many are considered to be natural disas-
ters, inappropriate for any sort of adjudication or formal resolution. These
limits on the notion of transformative torts are discussed below.
1. Spatial and Temporal Limits on the Concept of Transformative
Tort
The Buffalo Creek disaster and the asbestos litigation both illustrate
what a transformative tort is not.
In the West Virginia coal country in 1972, a makeshift coal company
dam disintegrated, causing a flood which destroyed most of the villages in
the Buffalo Creek hollow. More than 125 people were killed and 4000
rendered homeless. Not only individuals, but the entire community was
destroyed.7 ' The mass litigation that followed was subsequently resolved
by an out-of-court settlement.71 In contrast to the Agent Orange case, the
settlement was apparently satisfactory to the plaintiffs; they did not ap-
pear to desire the sort of broader dialogue whose absence frustrated the
Agent Orange veterans.
The Buffalo Creek disaster, even though it involved the destruction of a
whole community, did not constitute a transformative tort. That the victim
was a whole community was not enough in itself. The victims did not seek
to transform the larger community that adjudicated the event. The values
of a nation were not greatly affected by the events in a mountain hollow,
70. Kai Erikson, a sociologist hired by the plaintiffs' law firm to examine the effects of the disas-
ter on the community, describes the emotional trauma suffered by the victims at Buffalo Creek:
By individual trauma I mean a blow to the psyche that breaks through one's defenses so
suddenly and with such brutal force that one cannot react to it effectively ...
By collective trauma, on the other hand, I mean a blow to the basic tissues of social life that
damages the bonds attaching people together and impairs the prevailing sense of communal-
ity. . . . [It is] a gradual realization that the community no longer-exists as an effective source
of support and that an important part of the self has disappeared. . . . [The survivors] learn
that they are isolated and alone, wholly dependent upon their own individual resources.
K. ERIKSON, supra note 49, at 153-54 (emphasis in original).
71. The survivors of the Buffalo Creek disaster filed suit in federal court. The defendants (the
Pittston Company) eventually settled with the 600 claimants out of court for $13.5 million, compris-
ing $5.5 million for property damage and wrongful-death claims, and S8 million for psychic harm.




even though local values probably were. An event's place on the trans-
formative-conventional continuum therefore depends on the scale of the
event with respect to the jurisdiction in which the event is adjudicated or
otherwise resolved. A transformative tort is a local matter, even though
the locale may be as large as the United States.
The scale of a disaster may be determined not only by spatial factors,
but temporal ones as well. The asbestos litigation is a good example. The
combined impact of asbestos litigation to date could have had a transform-
ative effect. However, the asbestos litigation took place over many years,
in many small trials throughout the nation.2 None of the individual
plaintiffs-mainly older working-class men-has attracted concentrated
attention from the media. No single trial had a particularly large impact;
important cases such as Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corpora-
tion73 seemed to conform more to the landmark opinion paradigm de-
scribed below rather than to the notion of a transformative tort. Even
though asbestos has caused tremendous damage its effects have been too
diffuse to engender dynamism and too anonymous to engender
individuation.
Dynamism requires not only a large shift in values, but also a rapid
shift in values. The common law can adequately adapt itself to very large
social or technological changes, but only when these changes are not
packed into one case. 71
2. Natural Disasters
It is difficult to distinguish between natural disasters and torts. To call
an event an "Act of God," rather than a tort, is a decision on liability,
rather than a meaningful distinction based on lack of human agency or
foreseeability. Tall buildings are vulnerable to earthquake damage; to call
an earthquake an "Act of God" is merely to say that builders of tall
buildings are not liable for the consequences of earthquakes. Driving a car
creates risk of accidents; not holding a driver liable for risk because the
driver could not "foresee" the risk" is similar to absolving a builder for
damages resulting from an earthquake.
Although natural disasters are not distinguished by unusual foreseeabil-
ity characteristics, they generally resemble transformative torts. They af-
fect communities, as well as individuals, 76 and can certainly influence
72. See P. BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUcT (1985). The impact of asbestos need not have
been so diffuse. Congressional intervention was attempted with the proposal of asbestos compensation
bills in 1977 and 1980. See id. at 194-95. These bills were never enacted.
73. 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982) (denying "state-of-the-art" defense to asbestos defendants).
74. See infra text accompanying note 84.
75. See, e.g., Breunig v. American Family Ins. Co., 45 Wisc. 2d 536, 173 N.W.2d 619 (1970)
(driver who caused accident because of hallucinations not liable because she did not know she was
likely to hallucinate and thus could not foresee risk).
76. "[D]isasters often disrupt the normal function of governments and communities . . . " 42
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community values. Our reactions to natural disasters resemble those devel-
oped in the transformative tort paradigm. For example, disaster relief is
particularized and does not involve rule-bound adjudication, nor does it
involve a notion of making the victims whole."'
Not all natural disasters are transformative torts, and not all transform-
ative torts are natural disasters. Natural disasters that do not engender
dynamism or mass individuation certainly exist. Conversely, some trans-
formative tort-like events escape the "natural disaster" pigeonhole, gener-
ally those with a pronounced technological character." But we still tend
to view the mass disaster as sent by God, rather than created by
humans. 80 We do so possibly because conventional ideas of tort cannot
cope with the transformative character of many of these events.
III. ADJUDICATION, LEGISLATION AND TRANSFORMATIVE TORTS
This Section further develops the limitations of common law adjudica-
tion as a response to transformative torts, and discusses the legislative role
in the resolution of these events.
A. The Common Law and Transformative Torts
Transformative torts make bad common law by straining the process of
traditional judicial decisionmaking. Dynamism strains the evolutionary
process of the common law. Transformative tort adjudication attacks judi-
cial rationality. Finally, courts are relatively poor at making the decisions
required in transformative tort adjudication.
Dynamism deprives the common law of the time required to work itself
out."1 But what about landmark cases? Even the common law has impor-
tant individual cases that change its shape. How does this differ from
transformative tort adjudication?
The common law is ordinarily viewed as poised in tension between
"continuity and change" 8 -stare decisis and landmark opinions. How-
U.S.C. § 5121(a)(2) (1982).
77. See 42 U.S.C. § 5141(b) (1982) (presidential authority to declare major natural disaster pred-
icated only on gubernatorial request).
78. But rather, disaster relief involves "alleviating the damage, loss, hardship or suffering
caused" by the disaster. 42 U.S.C. § 5122(2) (1982) (emphasis added).
79. See Huber, The Old-New Division in Risk Regulation, 69 VA. L. REv. 1025 (1983).
80. But see A. WIJKMAN & L. TIMBERLAKE, NATURAL DISAsTmEs: ACTS OF GOD OR ACTS OF
MAN 6 (1984) ("Though triggered by natural events such as floods and earthquakes, disasters are
increasingly man-made. . . .Disasters are political and social events which can be and often are
prevented.").
81. Professor Deutsch has described the role of time in the common law: "The key to the stability
of the common law is. . .time: time in which to develop a pattern of decision whose meaning will be
accessible to hindsight, and time in which to accommodate, in terms of shifting doctrine, the changes
required of the law by changing social conditions." Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimary, and the Supreme
Court: Some Intersections Between Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REv. 169, 235 (1968).
82. G. CALABREsi, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTEs 3 (1982). Dean Calabresi has
observed that the "law could normally be updated without dramatic breaks through common law
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ever, most landmark decisions only appear to be a break from the past. In
fact, they are usually the end product of some gradual process and are
presaged by an upsurge of concurrences, dissents, and increasingly unten-
able legal fictions.8" The underlying community consensus also changes
gradually: The apparently abrupt change in legal doctrine lags behind the
consensus as much as leads it. Facts-new technologies and modes of so-
cial interaction-transform values slowly enough so that their separation
is reasonably complete in any individual case. But eventually, societal val-
ues-changing over many cases and years-fall out of kilter with legal
rules. The realignment of values and rules then takes place abruptly in a
single landmark decision.
In contrast to a landmark decision, where rules merely track values that
have largely changed already, the adjudication of a transformative tort re-
quires that rules and values change simultaneously. Transformative tort
adjudication is marked by extraordinary fact patterns; the underlying fact
pattern behind a landmark decision is usually quite ordinary. In trans-
formative torts, facts and changed values are both packed into one case.
Adjudication of transformative torts must affect preexisting societal atti-
tudes as much as reflect them. In this sense, adjudication of transformative
torts resembles legislation.84
Transformative tort adjudication is inimical to a certain type of judicial
rationality. In a sense, the judicial requirement for rationality is of a pe-
culiarly narrow kind-the obligation of courts to provide reasoned, 5 uni-
adjudication and revision of precedents." Id. at 4. This statement is consistent with this Note; trans-
formative torts are rare, and their effects on adjudication can normally be ignored.
83. Negligence, strict liability and comparative negligence were all innovations in tort law which,
although usually ascribed to one landmark opinion, were the result of a slower movement of law. See,
e.g., Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850) (negligence), described in M. HORwIrz, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 89-91 (1977); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal.
2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963) (strict liability for products), described tn Priest, The
Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort
Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 496-505 (1985); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d
1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975) (comparative negligence), described in Fleming, Foreword: Compar-
ative Negligence at Last-byJudicidal Choice, 64 CALIF. L. REv. 239 (1976).
84. "When the cases that make the law are the same ones that apply it ... the distinction
between legislation and adjudication hangs by a slender thread." R. UNGER, supra note 69, at 97.
Dworkin views legislation as concerned with "expanding or changing our public standards." R.
DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE 217 (1986). Adjudication, on the other hand, "interpret[s] these [legisla-
tive] standards to find implicit standards between and beneath the explicit ones." Id. In Dworkin's
framework, then, transformative tort adjudication would be that which must expand or change public
standards, and cannot be viewed as interpreting them.
85. Lon Fuller distinguishes the reasoned argument used in courts from the reasoned argument
characteristic of other fora (including the political forum), by stressing its formal and institutionalized
nature.
Adjudication is, then, a device which gives formal and institutional expression to the influ-
ence of reasoned argument in human affairs. As such it assumes a burden of rationality not
borne by any other form of social ordering. A decision which is the product of reasoned argu-
ment must be prepared itself to meet the test of reason. We demand of an adjudicative decision
a kind of rationality we do not expect of the results of contract or of voting. This higher
responsibility toward rationality is at once the strength and the weakness of adjudication as a
form of social ordering.
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versally applicable justifications for their decisions. To the extent that in-
dividuation is a significant motive force for transformative tort
adjudication, universalism must be discarded. Dynamism poses a different
threat to judicial rationality, that of articulating a community standard
which is being shaped by the very adjudication that articulates it.86
Another kind of judicial rationality is implicated by transformative tort
adjudication: reliability of decisionmaking. The growth of the common
law places a relatively small value on individual cases, relying on a pro-
cess of trial and error. However, large-scale torts are different from most
conventional cases, in that there is a greater need to judge rightly the first
time. The size of the case ensures that the loss from incorrect fact finding
is greater than for small cases."7 The relative scarcity of large-scale torts
means that legal errors are less likely to be corrected soon, especially for
legal issues unique to mass disasters.
Common law judges, who tend to be generalists "unfit for processing
specialized information,"" are probably less suited for one-shot decision-
making than legislatures, which can more efficiently specialize because of
their committee structures and staff support.89
B. The Legislative Role in Transformative Torts
Legislative involvement in dispute resolution is an old idea, hearkening
back at least as far as the right to petition of colonial days.90 The right to
petition fell into desuetude, largely because of legislative overload.", It is
this legislative overload that ensures that a legislative role in transforma-
tive tort resolution would not damage the role of the judiciary. As long as
administrative treatment of new incidents is precluded, Congress has the
time and inclination to deal only with the most politically significant torts.
The events which create the greatest political pressure are the ones that
furthest violate the conventional tort paradigm.
Legislative resolution of such events tends to be sui generis, based on
the political characteristics of the situation. Such resolution is political in
nature, based on political notions of reconciliation rather than justice-
Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 366-67 (1978).
86. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
87. Presumably, common fact patterns will eventually be adjudicated correctly, after the courts
have become accustomed to a particular sort of case. Mass cases retard this judicial learning curve by
reducing the frequency of litigation.
88. D. Hoaowrrz, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 25 (1977).
89. The straitened rules of evidence, prohibition on ex parte communication, and dependence on
facts presented by the litigants make judicial fact finding even more difficult. See Note, Choosing
Representatives by Lottery Voting, 93 YALE L.J. 1283, 1285 n.12 (1984) (limitations of judicial fact
finding compared with strengths of legislative fact finding).
90. See Note, A Short History of the Right to Petition Government for the Redress of Grievances,
96 YALE L.J. 142 (1986).
91. Id. at 147-49. In the Federal Congress, the politics of slavery played a more significant role in
weakening the right to petition. Petitioning for dispute resolution had its greatest vitality at the colo-
nial (or state) level.
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based ideas of compensation. Logrolling and compromise, so foreign to
formal legal thought, are appropriate here. The legislature may choose to
create a separate administrative system to compensate the tort victims, as
it did with the black lung program.'2 It may choose to modify the tort
system by limiting the judicial role, as with the lower tiers of Price-
Anderson. It may decide to expropriate a tortfeasor corporation,"3 or ex-
pend federal resources on victims and their local governments," or it may
decide to do nothing. Any of these responses may be appropriate in a
particular case, as long as a political-not administrative-process is ob-
served. Although creation of an administrative agency may be an appro-
priate legislative response to an individual event, 5 routine administrative
handling of these events violates the sui generis concept of reconciliation.
Administrative agencies tend to become routinized and subject to bureau-
cratic rules and precedents, which share the same problems as judicial
ones.
These responses are not hypothetical; they all have occurred. Perhaps
politicians, lawyers and other policymakers already understand transform-
ative tort analysis, and wisely ignore both tort economics and the legal
system. In such case, this Note merely articulates common knowledge.
IV. CONCLUSION
Adjudication is not necessarily a mere barometer of community values,
even outside the transformative tort framework. Owen Fiss's "structural"
litigation and Abram Chayes's "public law" litigation have marked simi-
larities to transformative tort litigation.' Fiss, especially, in stressing the
92. The black lung program is a federal adjunct to state workers' compensation programs
designed to "compensate coal miners and their dependents for totally disabling respiratory and pulmo-
nary impairments arising as a direct consequence of coal mine employment." Ramsey & Habermann,
The Federal Black Lung Program-The View from the Top, 87 W. VA. L. REv. 575 (1985). See 30
U.S.C. § 901(a) (1982).
93. This is apparently constitutional, at least for partial takings. Retroactive workers' compensa-
tion assessments of employers were ruled constitutional in Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428
U.S. 1 (1976). The Court indicated that "[t]he retrospective aspects of legislation, as well as the
prospective aspects, must meet the test of due process and the justifications for the latter may not
suffice for the former." Id. at 17. The court went on to reject retrospective imposition of liability for
purposes of deterrence or blameworthiness, accepting a loss-spreading compensation rationale. Id. at
18.
No new law can be devoid of at least some retroactive impact. See Graetz, Legal Transitions: The
Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax Revision, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 47 (1977). See supra note 63.
94. This is a response-executive rather than legislative-of the Disaster Relief Act. 42 U.S.C. §§
5121-5202 (1982). An executive role in resolution of transformative torts is certainly more problem-
atic than a legislative role; executive overload is far less likely to ensure restraint, and executive action
is far more likely to be routinized.
95. The federal black lung program is an example of an administrative program set up as a
response to a particular event. See supra note 92.
96. See Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281 (1976);
Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms ofJustice, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1979).
See also B. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW 28-37 (1984) (discussing institutional-
ization of "activist lawyering").
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role of the judiciary as a supplier of norms, foreshadows this Note's dis-
cussion of dynamism." However, both of these authors appear to advocate
judicial resolution of these "public" or "structural" cases.
This Note's development of the transformative tort rubric argues the
opposite case: that a certain kind of litigation should be treated legisla-
tively. But there is no real disagreement between this Note and these au-
thors. The line between legislation and adjudication is blurred; litigation
and legislation are complementary, not competitive. If functions tradition-
ally considered legislative have an adjudicative component, the converse is
also true. Transformative torts are traditionally treated as private law
when not viewed as a natural disaster totally outside the law. However,
they may also be fittingly resolved by the political process.
97. Fiss, supra note 96, at 30. Fiss seems to imply that judicial norm-setting is the bread and
butter of adjudication, while this Note assumes that normal cases are centered around dispute resolu-
tion. Id. at 36. However, transformative torts are not normal cases and do seem to resemble Fiss's
"structural" litigation.
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